Abstract: This paper presents a contrastive approach to the presence of two distinct types of verbal irony in real (natural, unscripted) versus fictional (scripted) discourse, with a special focus on irony blindness, i.e. the inability to recognize ironic utterances. Irony strategies are categorized into two general types, based on the relationship between the expressed and the intended meaning (Type 1: meaning reversal and Type 2: meaning replacement). First, the differences between these two types are discussed in terms of use, interpretation, and misinterpretation. It is found that the first type of irony strongly prevails in natural discourse, while the second type is considerably more present in fictional discourse than it is in natural discourse. At the same time, the first type of irony appears to be more at risk of misinterpretation in natural discourse, as opposed to the second type, which seems to be a safer (even though less frequently selected) option. These findings are then further analyzed in light of the discussion concerning fictional (comedic, in particular) irony blindness and the construction and role of the irony-blind characters. Interestingly, the causes of fictional irony blindness are found to correlate more strongly with the (more humorous) misinterpretation of the second type of irony.
Introduction
Verbal irony (henceforth irony) is usually treated as a unified phenomenon and any differences among the particular strategies that speakers employ in order to achieve it are not investigated (Attardo 2000 , Kumon-Nakamura et al. 1995 , Wilson and Sperber 1992 , Kreuz and Glucksberg 1989 , Clark and Gerrig 1984 Eleni Kapogianni: University of Kent. E-mail: e.kapogianni@kent.ac.uk alia). However, in the light of recent studies (Kapogianni 2011a (Kapogianni , 2013 Partington 2011; Dynel 2013a Dynel , 2013b , the necessity arises to examine and categorize irony strategies, a line of research which is bound to reveal crucial differences at multiple levels: pragmatic (discourse), cognitive, and cultural.
The definition of the term irony strategy can be given as follows: it is a rhetorical device that employs a range of linguistic (pragmatic) features in order to express the speaker's ironic intention. Under this perspective, which assumes a definition of irony in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions 1 (Kapogianni 2011a (Kapogianni , 2013 , irony is a multi-strategy phenomenon, comprising strategies such as echoic mention (Sperber and Wilson 1981, Wilson and Sperber 1992) , indirect negation (Giora 1995) , surrealistic irony (Kapogianni 2011a) , etc. The various irony strategies are not just different means to the same end. It is reasonable to suppose that strategy selection is influenced by different factors and serves different purposes.
The present discussion employs a typological classification of irony strategies, based on linguistic pragmatic criteria, and highlights a variety of factors that influence their choice and interpretation. Section 2 presents the typology of irony strategies and explains the central hypothesis of this paper, namely a correlation between the idiosyncratic characteristics of each irony type (mainly meaning derivation and humor) and its use and (mis)interpretation in different discourse contexts. The hypothesized correlation is first investigated in terms of irony type frequency in real (unscripted) versus fictional (scripted) discourse (Section 3). Then, the discussion focuses on cases of misinterpretation and the issue of irony blindness and, in particular, its representation through comedic characters. More specifically, Section 4 aims to explain: (a) how the idiosyncratic characteristics of the two irony types affect their risk of misinterpretation in real versus fictional discourse, and (b) how irony types are exploited in the comedic portrayal of irony blindness. two pragmatic criteria, in the form of the following questions: (a) Is there some semantic relationship between the expressed and the intended meaning? and (b) What sort of reasoning underlies the derivation of the intended meaning? The second part of this section (2.2) is concerned with the factors that influence the interpretation of irony types, leading to predictions about its contexts of use.
Irony types
Applying the aforementioned criteria to the variety of irony strategies leads to their classification into two main types: the first one, also being the most typical and commonly discussed, can be termed meaning reversal (Type 1), and the second one, in which there is no semantic relationship between the expressed and the intended meaning, can be termed meaning replacement (Type 2). The following examples (1-5) present a variety of strategies that can be classified under each general type (the first line provides the expressed meaning, the second line the intended meaning, i.e. the ironic implicature, and the code in brackets denotes the source of the example 2 ):
(1) I love having to mark all these essays! [Gr-IM] +> I hate having to mark all these essays.
(2) a. There is a bit of a drizzle. [En-F] +> The rain is really heavy. b. At 30 km/h, I'm approaching the speed of light! [Gr-TSh] +> 30 km/h is a really slow speed. Examples (1-2), both coming from the corpus of natural discourse, can be classified under the meaning reversal type of irony because a semantic relationship between (some element of) the expressed and the intended meaning can be detected. Example (1) is a typical case of opposition, where the ironically intended meaning is an antonym of the expressed meaning. Examples (2a) and (2b) also illustrate the process of meaning reversal, although not through a direct and absolute opposition as in (1), but rather through reversal on a scale: the hearer needs to consider an ad hoc scale from "bit of drizzle" to "heavy rain" and one from "really slow speed" to "speed of light" in order to get to the intended meaning of the speaker. Therefore, the general strategy of reversal can be further distinguished into absolute (antonymy) and scalar (relative). Moving on to the second general type of irony, meaning replacement, the main characteristic of which is the lack of semantic relationship between what is expressed and what is intended, it can be observed that the intended proposition (always some sort of negative evaluation towards a previous utterancehenceforth target utterance) completely replaces the expressed proposition. In example (3), an instance of fictional discourse in which a car driver has just been stopped by a police officer (speaker A is the driver, and speaker B the police officer), speaker B responds to speaker A in a way that is not irrelevant to the question but is obviously counterfactual, his main intention being to express a negative attitude towards the driver's redundant question. Example (4), another case of fictional discourse taken from a TV series, illustrates the strong element of incompatibility on which this type of irony relies. Even if the lack of counterfactuality makes this a less obvious example of irony, it still fulfills the three necessary conditions for the presence of irony (background contrast, incompatibility with context, and speaker's evaluative attitude, cf. Kapogianni 2011a). Here, speaker A intends to criticize speaker B's nosy question by responding in a completely uninformative manner, which contradicts the expectations related to the adjacency pair of question and (informative) answer. As in the other examples of this type, the intended meaning is not any sort of reversal of the expressed meaning, but it is a negative evaluation of the target utterance (question) instead. Finally, in (5), which comes from an online forum discussion (natural discourse), a diff erent subtype of this irony type (meaning replacement) is illustrated: the irrelevant and counterfactual statement. This statement is not in any way related to the context, but it is used as a juxtaposition (usually of a similar structure) to the target utterance (in this example, Tom's reported statement that he is the best in class). By juxtaposing the two statements, it emerges that the original must be as flawed as the one that carries the ironic intent.
To sum up, the meaning replacement type of irony makes use of an incompatible, often counterfactual and even surrealistic meaning in order to convey criticism against the target statement or idea. The ironic utterance can be either relevant to the context while also being incompatible (incongruous) and inappropriate (3 and 4), or it can be contextually irrelevant and in an obvious juxtaposition to the target (evaluated) utterance (5). Figure 1 summarizes the main types and subtypes of irony presented above.
Comparison of the two general irony types
The two general irony types (meaning reversal and meaning replacement) exhibit some considerable differences, primarily in terms of meaning derivation and, additionally, in terms of humor.
The first main observation is that the nature of incongruity between the utterance and its context is different for the two irony types. For the meaning reversal type, recognition of the irony is only possible through the realization that the utterance is untrue for the given context, a realization that is not always obvious: the hearers need to have enough contextual information in order to be led to it (e.g. in example [1] in the previous section, the hearer needs to know that the speaker normally considers essay marking a chore as opposed to finding it pleasant). For the meaning replacement type, on the other hand, the hearers are immediately faced with a strong incompatibility between the utterance and context, for which they have to account in order to make any sense out of the utterance (examples [3]-[5] ). At the same time, they have to consider the juxtaposition of the utterance to the target utterance, while resorting to a syllogism such as "If the [target] utterance is valid/sensible/appropriate, then the speaker's utterance is also valid/sensible/appropriate. The speaker's utterance is blatantly invalid/ absurd/inappropriate and, therefore, so is the target utterance".
The contrast between (a) the actual context of a meaning reversal ironic utterance, and (b) the context for which the literal meaning of this utterance would be appropriate is only observable by discourse participants who have full information about the actual context (including, for example, the speaker's beliefs and attitudes). This means that this kind of contrast, and therefore the ironic interpretation, could be missed due to the lack of appropriate clues. The meaning replacement irony type, on the other hand, comprises strategies that overemphasize this very contrast between the actual and the utterance-appropriate context, making it rather difficult to be missed.
Another feature that distinguishes the two types is their relationship with humor. The type of meaning replacement (which can often be characterized as "surrealist irony", especially in the cases where the utterance is completely unrelated to the given context) is almost always perceived as humorous (Kapogianni 2011a (Kapogianni , 2013 , whereas the judgments vary when the first type of meaning reversal is concerned, depending on the context. These observations tie in with the very nature of the meaning replacement type, which relies on the same incongruity resolution process as all of verbal humor.
Given the above discussion, three central predictions can be made in relation to the use and function of the different types of irony across different discourse contexts: (a) the less striking contrast between appropriate and actual context will make the meaning reversal type more prone to misinterpretation, (b) the humorous nature of the meaning replacement type will enhance its use in humorous contexts, and (c) -given (a) and (b) -misinterpretation of the meaning replacement type, being more unexpected and simultaneously more humorous, will be prevalent in fictional contexts, especially when the humor revolves around a character's inability to see the irony. These hypotheses will be tested and discussed in the remainder of the paper.
Frequency observations
In order to have a basis for comparison between the two kinds of discourse that are contrasted in this paper, this section presents some evidence concerning the presence of the two general types of irony in real (natural) and fictional (scripted) discourse. The discussed data come from a variety of natural and scripted sources, in Modern Greek and English. Greek is of particular interest, since the phenomenon of irony has not been studied extensively in this language (exceptions: Faraklou 1998 Faraklou , 2000 Tsakona 2011 ). The choice to present frequency data in sep-arate tables for Greek and English was made solely on the principle that each collection of examples relied on a different variety of sources. Any cross-linguistic and cross-cultural considerations were thus not part of the scope of this paper.
In terms of methodology, some preliminary data were collected based on speakers' intuitions, independent from any theoretical bias (e.g. internet users retrospectively marking their discussion board posts or instant messages as ironic, or using the "#sarcasm" hashtag on Twitter). These were then used as the empirical ground for the consideration of necessary and sufficient conditions for the presence of irony, in conjunction with the findings of previous related analyses (Kapogianni 2013) . After the proposed set of conditions was theoretically and empirically corroborated, it was used as the main criterion for any further collection of data. Table 1 presents information about the sources of Greek and English data (the abbreviations next to each source were used for coding purposes). Table 2 shows the number of ironic instances collected from each Greek source. Some of the collected ironic utterances contained more than one ironic sentence; each sentence was coded and counted as a separate instance (unit).
As shown in Table 2 , a total of 61 instances was collected from the four sources of natural discourse, and 51 instances were collected from the two sources of fictional discourse. Table 3 presents the observed frequency of the 3 This is part of the project "Investigation of the conversational narratives produced by youths of Patras, Greece", funded by the research committee of the University of Patras, Greece (K. Karatheodoris, 2425). I am grateful to Dr. Argiris Archakis, research project coordinator, for providing me permission of use. 
Natural discourse

Source
Greek English
Talk shows (TSh) P Instant messaging (IM) P Forums (F ) P P "Karatheodoris" data-base recordings 3 (KR) P Twitter (T ) P
Scripted discourse
TV series / Movies (TS/M) P P Comic books (CB) P meaning reversal (Type 1) versus meaning replacement (Type 2) irony types in each of the two types of discourse. These results show a great prevalence of the meaning reversal type in natural data. They also show the reverse picture in the case of scripted data, which creates a rather striking contrast between the two types of discourse. The contrast was milder in the case of English data, but the distribution of the meaning replacement type was still very uneven between natural and scripted discourse, even if the meaning reversal type prevailed in both (data presented in Table 5 below). Table 4 shows the overall amount of collected irony instances from each English source, and Table 5 shows the presence of each irony type in real versus scripted discourse contexts. The meaning replacement type (Type 2) remained less frequent than the meaning reversal type (Type 1) across discourse contexts. However, the most important observation here is the considerably higher percentage of the meaning replacement type in scripted as opposed to real discourse.
Overall, the first irony type (meaning reversal), which is generally considered as the most typical one, is also used more frequently overall, or, at least, in the less demanding/less innovative contexts which are mostly associated with natural discourse. The prevalence of the second type (meaning replacement) within scripted data for the Greek collection is an interesting finding, which leads to the conclusion that the humorous character of this type makes it more preferable in fictional (comedic) contexts. The English evidence does not contradict this observation, in the sense that there is still a considerable percentage of the second type of irony found in fictional discourse, even if this is not enough to surpass the prevalent presence of the first type of irony. Of course, as pointed out earlier, the variation among the types of sources that were used for each language was rather significant in this collection of data and, as a result, no further claims can be made regarding the observed asymmetry between the two languages without a more thorough cross-cultural and cross-linguistic investigation.
Irony misinterpretation -irony blindness
Irony blindness can be defined in opposition to circumstantial misinterpretation: while the former is a characteristic of the recipient (addressee, [over]hearer, viewer), the latter is influenced by factors such as the contextual circumstances and their ability to reinforce or obscure the ironic meaning, as well as the irony strategy itself, which may be more or less prone to misinterpretation. This section looks at both circumstantial misinterpretation and fictional irony blindness and their different manifestations. Furthermore, the present discussion aims at drawing parallels between the factors that affect successful irony interpretation at a circumstantial level and the causes of fictional irony blindness.
Circumstantial misinterpretation
Ideally, a comprehensive examination of irony misinterpretation would include both cases of overtly misunderstanding the irony and covertly missing the irony, i.e. the recipient remaining unresponsive, being unaware of the presence of irony. However, the case of covertly missing the irony is not easy (if not impossible) to detect. This is because a lack of response may equally mean either silent/implicit appreciation or failure of recognition (Kotthoff 2003) . A caveat when studying misinterpretation is, therefore, the fact that it is only explicit misunderstandings that are recorded in conversation, while numerous cases of failure of recognition of the phenomenon remain under the radar. The following observations come from a study of irony misinterpretation in the medium of asynchronous Computer Mediated Communication (CMC). This medium was preferred because, aside from the advantage of the body of on-line texts functioning as a searchable corpus, it provides fertile ground for misinterpretations, since the lack of extralinguistic cues makes the interpretation of irony dependent on linguistic and contextual information only. As research by Hancock (2004) revealed, contrary to what would be expected from the lack of extralinguistic cues and the consequent risk of miscommunication, irony is not avoided in CMC, but it rather tends to be used to a greater extent than in face-toface communication. A total of 50 dialogues containing misinterpreted ironies were collected, both in Greek and English. Here, I will not report on any quantitative indications, but I will focus on the qualitative findings of the analysis of this collection of examples.
The body of misinterpreted utterances can clearly be divided into three categories of ironic sub-strategies: (a) meaning reversal (Type 1) ironies that include a relative/subjective (evaluative) term, (b) meaning reversal ironies that include an echoed opinion, that is, in fact, the opinion that the ironist intends to criticize, (c) a very limited number of instances of meaning replacement (Type 2) irony of the context-relevant subtype. The first important observation is, therefore, that there is a considerable difference between the first and the second type of irony in terms of causes of misinterpretation.
In the first category of misinterpreted examples, the central element is some case of subjective judgment expressed via the use of adjectives, adverbs, and various evaluative expressions (e.g cheap/expensive, fast/slow, fortunately/ unfortunately, etc.). The misinterpretation of these is justified by the lack of sufficient contextual and common ground information available to the addressee/ reader. Given the usual anonymity and/or lack of personal relationship between interlocutors in CMC, it is understandable why addressees have considered the ironic utterance as the ironist's plausible literal contribution. The presence of misinterpreted ironies that use the echoic mention strategy is also easily justifiable, considering that an echoed phrase is usually likely to be uttered in the same context by someone with the same ideas as the ironist's target. Gibbs (2012: 106) also points out the necessity of recognizing the source of the echo as a common precondition for the correct interpretation of echoic ironies, which is something that is not always possible. Finally, it is worth noting that the small number of instances of misinterpreted meaning replacement (Type 2) ironies, are contextually relevant (as opposed to context-irrelevant utterances) and the addressee justifies them as a mistake/miscalculation or ignorance on the part of the speaker.
This categorization of misinterpreted ironies concurs with what can be seen as part of the wider categorization of implicit meaning misinterpretation proposed by Yus (1999) . He recognizes three major factors of miscommunication at the level of the implicit: the lack of necessary contextual assumptions (which cause a "puzzled understanding"), the erroneous use of alternative contextual assumptions, and the hearer considering it unnecessary to search for a meaning other than the explicit (both of which lead to "an alternate understanding"). Yus (1999: 512) considers the misinterpretation of irony as a consequence of the third factor. However, it is clear from this analysis that accepting the explicit meaning as the intended one is a direct consequence of (the combination of) the other two factors: a lack of necessary background assumptions, established common ground, and indications of the speaker's intentions.
The second irony type (meaning replacement) stands out in this analysis, not only because of the lack of evidence of misinterpretation for its "context irrelevant" substrategy, but also because of the fact that the necessary factors for its successful interpretation do not coincide with the aforementioned factors that mostly affect the first type of irony. When it comes to necessary background assumptions, these come from non-situational general world knowledge (and are therefore less likely to be missing), and as for the search for cues regarding the ronist's insincerity/lack of seriousness, these are usually obvious due to the strong incongruity and/or counterfactuality of the statements of this irony type.
On the whole, despite some common generalizations, there seem to be different causes of misunderstanding for the two general types of irony, which employ different strategies (e.g. the highly context dependent strategy of echoic mention employed by the first type) and rely on different types of assumptions (e.g. assumptions about the beliefs of the speaker in the case of meaning reversal versus assumptions that come from world knowledge in the case of meaning replacement).
Irony blindness in fictional discourse
In reality, the inability to detect irony is usually considered a symptom of pragmatic language impairment (PLI), which, in turn, is linked to poor Theory of Mind (Happé 1993) . Although the status of PLI as either an independent impairment or a correlate of other disorders is frequently debated, a strong link between PLI and Autism Spectrum Disorders can be identified (Bishop 2000) . This means that the real-life profile of an irony blind individual would be of clinical nature. Although characters with PLI and related disorders (especially Autism Spectrum Disorders and Asperger Syndrome in particular) are frequently portrayed in fiction, it is interesting to note that there is a large category of non-clinical (or, at least, undiagnosed) characters who exhibit some of the characteristics of these impairments, usually intensified and exploited in a comical way. It is the latter category of characters that this section focuses on, under the assumption that irony blindness is an instrument of humorous fictional discourse.
This section attempts to bring together and shed more light on the observations highlighted in all previous sections: (a) the difference in interpretation process between the two main irony types, (b) the strong imbalance in the distribution of Type 2 irony between real and fictional discourse contexts (with the particular irony type being considerably more frequent in fictional discourse), and (c) the type-specific causes of irony misinterpretation. In order to achieve this goal, we need to analyze the functions of Type 2 irony in fictional discourse and examine its link to the irony blind character.
Categories of irony blind characters (some case studies)
The aim of discussing a selection of representative irony blind characters from different fictional texts is not to provide an exhaustive list, but rather to investi-gate some causes of irony blindness that extend further than the realistic and diagnosed representation of PLI (and related disorders) individuals. Typically, comic characters are found in the comedy genre, but they can also be found in different (and mixed) genres, where they fulfill the purpose of "comic relief".
It is worth starting this discussion with literal-minded characters and specifically the, now iconic, literal-minded Sheldon Cooper (a character in the 2007 CBS series The Big Bang Theory). It is often speculated that Sheldon, an exceptionally intelligent theoretical physicist with a notorious difficulty with social interaction and nonliteral/idiomatic language, suffers from Asperger Syndrome (or some other type of High Functioning Autism). This, however, has never been confirmed on the show. On the contrary, its creators have stated that they have deliberately left Sheldon undiagnosed, or even cleared from a diagnosable disorder (one of his most characteristic quotes being "I am not crazy, my mother had me tested"), in order to relieve the other characters and the audience from any guilt related to laughing at his expense. 4 Sheldon's relationship to irony is shown to evolve during the course of the series: in earlier episodes he is completely incapable of recognizing it, being in need of a "sarcasm sign", while in later episodes he achieves a few successful guesses regarding the presence of sarcasm and even attempts his (less successful) version of it. 5 Examples (6a, 6b, 6c) below demonstrate Sheldon's relationship to irony and, more specifically, its second type (meaning replacement). In these examples, all taken from the same dialogue, but analyzed separately since they constitute three different occurrences of irony, Sheldon shows uncertainty (6a) and then misinterpretation (6b, 6c) of examples of the second type of irony (meaning replacement). All examples fall within the category of contextrelevant incongruous response (driven by the context, but obviously counterfactual). As seen in Section 3, this subtype of irony can be misinterpreted in real discourse, but the likelihood of this happening is very low compared to the first type of irony, especially in the cases where the counterfactuality or inappropriateness is blatant (as in the present examples). What is also exemplified, here, is the heavy use of the second irony type in discourse, especially within the choice of retaining the ironic framework (multiple occurrences of the same type of irony within the same scene). Sheldon exemplifies the category of literal-minded comic characters, who are likely to miss not only irony but also other types of nonliteral language, even conventionalized ones (idioms). Other examples of this type of character are Peggy Parish's children's book character Amelia Bedelia (ongoing series since 1963), as well as, from the Greek corpus of examples, the character of Armodios from the series "An ipirxes tha se xoriza" (Literal translation: "If you existed, I'd break up with you", Mega Channel, 2007), who exhibits extreme literal-mindedness to the extent of interpreting literally even the most common idioms.
The second category of irony blind comedy character is the one who ignores basic common world-knowledge facts. Characters representing this category are also expected to miss ironies of the second type rather than the first one, since, as explained in Section 2, this type relies upon general or world knowledge rather than situational knowledge. These characters are not literal-minded, they are aware of the mechanisms of irony and the only reason they miss it is their lack of common knowledge that would help them detect the inappropriateness or counterfactuality of statements that carry the second irony type. One such character comes from the Greek comedy "Sto para pende" (Idiomatic translation "In the nick of time", Mega Channel, 2005): the character Dalia is a reclusive billionaire who has spent most of her adult life hiding in her mansion with no access to the outside world (being especially ignorant of the daily life of the middle and lower classes). In the following example she demonstrates ignorance of a commonly known type of sketch-based theatre, with a very long history in modern Greece. The ironic expression of Type 2, here, (based on the improbability of a play of the epitheorisi genre being a romance 7 ) is followed by an intonationally stressed (focus) repetition of the genre name, to provide the character with a further clue about the irony. However, she responds with a confused facial expression, which makes it clear that she completely missed both the irony strategy and the speaker's intended meaning. Her lack of understanding is also accentuated by the fact that, before the dialogue moves on, another character remarks "She still doesn't get it". Dalia is very often seen missing or misunderstanding ironic remarks directed at her, making this one of her main comedic strengths.
A similar but distinct category of irony blind character is the naïve character. A typical example would be Baldrick, Blackader's faithful servant in the TV comedy of the same name (Blackadder, 1983 -1989 ). Baldrick appears to be of lower intellect but also forever willing to trust his master's judgment and plans. In the following example, it becomes apparent that Baldrick's blind trust extends to the point of believing a completely outrageous and incongruous response.
6 Epitheorisi: "Modern Greek popular revue with skits and songs that satirize current social and political mores" (Oxford Encyclopedia of Theatre and Performance). In later years it has been considered a "lower" form of theatre, often associated with bad taste, low production quality, and predictable or dull humor. 7 A reviewer pointed out the need for distinction between irony and mockery: mockery is a much wider rhetorical device that can also be achieved through irony. Mockery can be achieved through a statement which may or may not be true, humorous, or compatible with the normal conversational expectations. When a mocking utterance is not true or is incompatible with the conversational expectations (e.g. question-informative answer) then it is a case of ironic mockery. It is, therefore, the element of incompatibility with truth or conversational norms that distinguishes ironic from non-ironic mockery. Baldrick not only misses the particular irony, which is another example of the second type, but also confirms Blackadder's (and the audience's) suspicion that he has not even heard of the trope. The difference between the naïve irony-blind character and the one who ignores world knowledge is that the former's inability to capture the phenomenon equates to (in addition to any world knowledge deficits) an inability to suspect the interlocutor of insincerity. Of course, the boundaries between these categories of irony blind characters can be blurred. For example, Joey, the character from the American TV sitcom "Friends" (1994, NBC) occasionally shows signs of both naivety and ignorance, often being presented as a character who misses the jokes made at his expense. For example, in the episode "The one with the fake Monica", Joey interprets his friend's ironic suggestion for the stage name "Joe/Joseph Stalin" as a serious one, going as far as to officially adopt it before finding out who the historic Joseph Stalin was.
Although the presented categorization concerns the fictional irony blind characters encountered during this investigation (which mostly focused on comic irony blind characters in movies and TV), further categories could be added after a more detailed examination across fictional discourse genres. It must be added that in the case of surreal/absurdist comedy, characters can be completely blind to obviously counterfactual or contextually incompatible remarks for no apparent reason. One such example is an episode of the long-running American cartoon series South Park (1997, Comedy Central) where a whole town becomes incapable of recognizing one character's increasingly absurd ironic remarks, taking them as serious suggestions and ending up with a completely nonsensical new sport (Episode "Sarcastaball") . In examples such as this one, irony blindness adds up to an absurdist style of humor and is only explained as "poetic/dramatic license".
On the whole, the main causes of irony misinterpretation detected in the discussion of Section 4.1 are also present in the cases of fictional irony blindness. We only looked at non-clinical irony blind characters, which is the majority, if not the entirety of comic irony blind characters. In this group, the explanation for irony blindness seems to be either an extreme or overly exaggerated version of the occasional sources of misunderstanding encountered in real discourse (lack of common knowl edge, or inability to interpret the speaker's intentions), or a highly stereotyped case of literal-mindedness, detached from any realistic symptomatology. In either case, it becomes apparent that, as indicated by the frequency study in Section 3, it is the second irony type that is preferred in fictional discourse, for stronger comedic effect, and particularly in relation to the irony blind characters and their idiosyncratic characteristics.
The author-character-audience triangle
The question of the relationship between the principles and conventions of real discourse and their fictional counterparts is a long debated one. In order to complete the present analysis, it is necessary to refer to the special circumstances that underlie fictional discourse and the dynamics among the triad authorcharacter-audience. Searle's (1975) early attempt to examine fictional discourse as a Speech Act of the author has been met with strong criticism (Culpeper 2001; Wood 2012) and it has since given rise to the realization that this type of discourse can only be analyzed through a double-level model, which has to include the in-script layer of communication between characters and the outer layer of communication between the writer and the audience (see also Dynel 2011) .
The intentions of the author(s) are to be taken into consideration within the framework of the genre to which their work belongs (Wood 2012) . Even though the analysis of authorial intent is often considered independent from the perception of the text, the perspective of the present study makes it necessary to adopt the two-level schema "addresser-message-addressee" (Figure 2 , adapted from Culpeper 2001: 39). Using this schema, we can discuss the case of irony blind characters, like the ones exemplified in the previous section. In the corresponding settings, it is clear that irony blindness serves the purposes of comedy (either within the genre of comedy itself, or as comic relief in a mixed genre). This means that the main intentions of the author(s) are to evoke comic situations, laughter, and even mock the comic irony blind character. This entails some important implications for the characterization of the irony-blind character. If we follow the distinction between "flat" and "round" characters (Culpeper 2001) , the former being more predictable, stereotyped, and rather one-dimensional, we would have to consider the comedic portrayal and exploitation of irony blindness as a characteristic pertaining to character flatness (especially since it is a characteristic that oversimplifies a complicated real-life condition). Note, however, that this does not condemn the character to a permanent state of flatness, since it only concerns the specific irony-related property, which serves a certain function and may well be somewhat independent from the character's overall identity and behavior. The nature of the humor derived from irony blindness is usually along the lines of a punchline (see examples in previous section), which is why it can be considered a selfcontained unit, or a "running gag", which does not directly influence the plot. An irony blind character may thus have a dual nature: that of an otherwise realistically portrayed individual, and that of the instrument of the comedic device of misunderstanding and frame-breaker (Eco 1984) .
The audience, from their part, approach the text with a pre-existing disposition towards the character, towards the scripted situation, and towards the genre. This means that, upon identifying (and stereotyping) a character as comically irony blind, they expect him or her to demonstrate the same behavior on different occasions and they also anticipate the humorous nature of the occurring misunderstandings. Of course, stereotypes and social schemata are more effortlessly used when interpreting fictional characters, since the act of stereotyping does not bear the same negative connotations that it does in the case of judging real individuals. In other words, fictional characters, and especially comic ones, cannot avoid some caricaturization, even if this happens on a scale of humanization, i.e. within a mixture of realistic ("humanizing", see Culpeper 2002 ) and unidimensional characteristics.
Finally, one remaining issue, which would have to be covered by a separate study, has to do with the coherence of characters in serialized texts with multiple authors (e.g. multiple season sitcoms, such as "The Big Bang Theory"). Even though we proceed to characterization assuming a somewhat unified behaviour of the irony blind hero, in reality, the character emerges as the sum of behaviors on different, more and less realistic/consistent contexts, which have been created by different authors (who may have slightly varying perceptions of the character). It is not uncommon for the audience of long-running serials to complain that a hero is acting "out of character", demonstrating a divergence between the authors' and the audience's perception of some aspect of the hero's character.
Conclusion
This paper investigated the correspondences between the inherent characteristics of two different types of irony and their presence and function across natural and fictional discourse. The two types of discourse (real-natural-unscripted and fictional-scripted) examined in this paper exhibit a number of different properties. On the one hand, real discourse is guided by communication principles which are expected to prioritize rhetorical effectiveness over rhetorical innovation, while, at the same time, spontaneity entails the lack of elaborate forward planning in the choice and formulation of irony strategies. These characteristics explain the prevalence of the simpler and more typical irony strategies that correspond to the meaning reversal type within real discourse. On the other hand, fictional discourse operates on two different levels and combines a number of more complicated goals: the goal of the author(s) is to induce specific feelings in the audience (in the case of comedy discourse, which was the focus here, this goal entails humor, laughter, and entertainment), the goal of the fictional character (especially the ironist) is to make a strong rhetorical point, while the role of the fictional irony blind character is to accentuate the humorous situation by misinterpreting a usually obvious irony. This, therefore, justifies why the second irony type -meaning replacement -is much more frequent in fictional discourse than real discourse, since it is better suited for the multiple purposes of the former.
It was shown that the condition of comedic irony blind char acters (not diagnosed with a real-life pragmatic language impairment) can be attributed to an exaggerated version of regular sources of irony misunder standings: literalmindedness, lack of world knowledge, and naivety. It also became apparent that these three sources of irony blindness are mostly linked to the misunderstanding of the meaning replacement type of irony, which would normally be considered more obvious. At the same time, the strong humorous nature of this type, is what makes it suitable for fictional misinterpretations that aim at the creation of humor and the accentuation of the peculiarities of the irony blind characters.
Overall, the presented evidence indicates that the meaning reversal type of irony is both more frequent and more prone to misinterpretation in natural discourse, while the humorous nature of the meaning replacement type encourages its use in humorous contexts. Fictional humorous contexts proved to be a more fitting environment for the use of the meaning replacement type of irony, especially when irony blind characters are present. Of course, the crucial division into the two types of verbal irony is still in need of further investigation from multiple perspectives (cross-linguistic/cross-cultural, typical/atypical processing).
